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CONSTITUTIONALIZING CIVIL COMMITMENT: ANOTHER
ATTEMPT-In re Harris, 98 Wn. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982).
In a recent case, In re Harris, I the Washington Supreme Court found
portions of the Washington involuntary commitment statute unconstitu-
tional. Ms. Harris claimed that the statute allowed the state to deprive her
of liberty without due process, and the Washington court agreed. To rem-
edy the defect, the court required a greater showing of "dangerousness"
and a judicial hearing prior to the issuance of a non-emergency summons.
The controversy began when Mary Ann Lee Harris hit her mother, in-
flicting bruises. 2 Her mother immediately petitioned King County to com-
mit Ms. Harris, alleging that she was dangerous. 3 Acting pursuant to the
summons procedure, 4 a King County Mental Health Official ordered Ms.
Harris to report for a seventy-two-hour commitment to be evaluated and
treated. 5 When Ms. Harris did not report, the county authorized the police
to pick her up. 6 Ms. Harris then became a fugitive. 7 The following week
her attorney obtained a temporary restraining order and requested a pre-
detention, show cause hearing. 8 When the King County Superior Court
refused to grant a hearing, she petitioned the Washington Supreme Court
for discretionary review, which was granted. 9
Ms. Harris claimed the statute violated her right to substantive due pro-
cess because it permitted involuntary commitment of persons determined
to be potentially dangerous. First, Ms. Harris argued that the standard
was unconstitutional because dangerousness could not be predicted accu-
rately,' 0 or, that if the court found the standard itself to be constitutional,
it should at least require that the dangerousness be imminent and evi-
denced by a recent overt act. 1 Second, Ms. Harris argued that the sum-
mons procedure described in the statute deprived her of liberty without
procedural due process. 12
1. In re Harris, 98 Wn. 2d. 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982).
2. Brief for Respondent at 3, Harris.
3. In re Harris, 98 Wn. 2d 276, 277, 654 P.2d 109, 110 (1982).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(a) (1983).
5. 'Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 277, 654 P.2d at 110.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 286, 654 P.2d at 113; Brief for Respondent at 3. Ms. Harris had been committed the
previous year for allegedly breaking her mother's ribs and did not want to be committed again. Id.
8. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 278, 654 P.2d at 110. The summons was served at 11:30 p.m. the Friday
of Memorial Day weekend, so no legal action could be taken until the next Tuesday.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 280, 654 P.2d at I 11. See also Brief of Petitioner at 13-17, Harris.
11. Harris, 98Wn. 2d at 281-82, 654P.2dat 112.
12. Id. at 285, 654 P.2d at 113.
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A unanimous Washington Supreme Court agreed in part with Ms. Har-
ris. Although the court did not reject the dangerousness standard, it held
that the standard must be interpreted to require evidence of a recent overt
act in order to meet substantive due process requirements. 13 It also found
that the summons procedure violated procedural due process require-
ments because it permitted issuance of a summons for an allegedly dan-
gerous individual without prior judicial review. 14
This Note first discusses recent statutory and judicial reforms of invol-
untary mental commitment procedures in the United States and Washing-
ton. It then analyzes the Washington Supreme Court's decision in In re
Harris, focusing on the court's interpretation of the required standard for
involuntary commitment and the new procedural requirements for issu-
ance of a summons. The Note concludes that the Washington Supreme
Court took a significant but incomplete step in conforming the Washing-
ton involuntary commitment procedures to the requirements of the United
States Constitution.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Trend to Reform Involuntary Commitment Proceedings
Traditionally, courts have based their power to commit the mentally ill
on two theories: parens patriae and police power. 15 Under the parens pa-
triae theory, the state operates as a parent to those of its citizens who are
incapable of taking care of their own needs, such as children, the old, and
the mentally ill. 16 Actions the state takes under this power are to protect
and advance the interests of these individuals. Under the police power
theory, in contrast, the state's primary function is to protect society. In
exercising its police power, the state may infringe on the individual's in-
terests for the benefit of the society as a whole. 17
13. Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
14. Id. at 287,654 P.2d at 114.
15. See Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190.
1207-27 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments], for an excellent discussion of the development
and theories behind these doctrines.
16. See C. WARREN. THE COURT OF LAST RESORT 23 (1982).
17. Developments, supra note 15, at 1222. Most state civil commitment statutes make provisions
for both types of commitment. Provisions that permit involuntary commitment of people who are
mentally ill and gravely disabled or are unable to care for themselves are parens patriae provisions.
Provisions that permit commitment when an individual is dangerous to others or to property are po-
lice power commitments. Provisions for commitment when an individual is dangerous to herself in-
clude elements of both the parens partiae and police power theories. See La Fond, An Examination of
the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 499. 501 n.10 (1981) for a
partial collection of statutes.
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Until the late 1960's, most civil commitments occurred under the par-
ens patriae power, with the most common commitment standard being
"mentally ill and in need of treatment." 18 Under statutes that incorpo-
rated this standard, a family doctor, a psychiatrist, or, in many cases, a
state official could order a person committed indefinitely for objection-
able or erratic behavior. Because the state was acting in the best interests
of the allegedly disturbed individual and because it was feared that the
formality of a quasi-courtroom setting would upset the individual, a per-
son could be committed with no notice, no opportunity to be heard, no
right to confront the accuser, and no right to judicial review. 19
During the late sixties and early seventies, commentators increasingly
criticized the vagueness of the commitment standard, the unbridled au-
thority of the committing officials, and the lack of protection for the men-
tally ill individual. 20 Action in two states set the stage for substantive
changes in mental commitment law. First, the California legislature in
1969 passed the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, which shifted the emphasis
in California's commitment law away from parens patriae commitments
toward police power commitments.2 1 The Act has served as a model in a
nationwide reform of commitment statutes. Second, a Wisconsin federal
district court delivered a 1972 landmark decision22 which influenced
mental commitment practices throughout the United States.
In Lessard v. Schmidt, the district court held that Wisconsin law enti-
tled an individual to substantive and procedural due process in involun-
tary commitment proceedings. 23 The court reasoned that the deprivations
of liberty suffered by an individual committed involuntarily under the
civil law are at least as great as those suffered by an individual in-
18. C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 23. See also S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
ANDTHE LAW 36(1971).
19. See S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, supra note 18, at 49-60.
20. See, e.g., Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107 (1974); Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal
Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 609, 612 (1974); Developments, supra note 15, at 1202.
21. Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, ch. 1667, § 36, 1967 Cal. Stat. 4074 (codified as amended at
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5401 (West 1972 & Supp. 1983)) (operative July 1, 1969). Sec-
tion 5200 (West Supp. 1983) deals with involuntary commitment procedures. Some commentators
have suggested, however, that the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act was passed to save money rather than
out of concern for the rights of the mentally ill. See, e.g., C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 22-23.
22. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-86 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The extensive subsequent history of Lessard may be evidence
of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to deal with the substantive issues raised by Lessard. On both
appeals, the Court dealt only with procedural matters. See 414 U.S. 473 (1974), 421 U.S. 957
(1975).
23. 349 F. Supp. at 1090-1100.
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carcerated under the criminal law. 24 Therefore, the court concluded that
civil commitment proceedings at least must meet the due process stan-
dards required for criminal convictions. 25 Accordingly, the Lessard court
placed three significant restrictions on civil commitment proceedings.
First, no confinement is permissible without a prior hearing unless there is
an emergency. 26 Second, before an individual may be committed, she is
entitled to full procedural due process. 27 Third, a mentally ill individual
may not be committed unless it is the least restrictive alternative for pro-
tecting society or the individual. 28
The Lessard court also clarified the commitment standard, holding that
an individual has to be dangerous to herself or others to justify commit-
ment. 29 Furthermore, her dangerousness has to be great enough to justify
the "massive curtailment of liberty" that involuntary civil commitment
represents. 30 The Lessard court decided that the court must apply a bal-
24. The Lessard court found that an individual who is committed loses many civil rights such as
unrestricted rights to make contracts, to sue or be sued, to receive certain occupational licenses, to
vote, to drive a car, to serve on a jury, or to be married. Furthermore, civil commitment results in a
serious social stigma, making it difficult to find a job, sign a lease, or buy a house. The death rate is
higher among those committed than among those in the population at large. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at
1088-90.
Most states have revised their statutes to eliminate the loss of civil liberties. See, e.g., WASH. REV
CODE § 71.05.060 (1983): "A person subject to confinement resulting from any petition or proceed-
ing pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall not forfeit any legal right or suffer any legal
disability as a consequence of any actions taken or orders made, other than as specifically provided in
this chapter. " The social stigma remains, however, and recent studies suggest that the morbidity rate
remains higher than that for the general population. See Brief for Respondent, Attachment A. at
8-12, Harris, for results of a 1981 Oregon study.
25. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1090. But see infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
26. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
27. Id. at 1103. The process must include adequate notice, a right to prompt hearing before a
judge, an opportunity to be heard, id. at 1092, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the patient is
mentally ill and dangerous, id. at 1095, the right to effective counsel, id. at 1097, the privilege and
evidence protections of the criminal process, id. at 1100-03, and the right to a jury, id. at 1092.
28. Id. at 1095-96.
29. Id. at 1093. The Lessard standard requires an extreme likelihood that if the person is not
confined, she will do immediate harm to herself or others. Id.
30. The Lessard court based its holding on dicta in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). In
Humphrey, a prisoner, convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a maximum sentence of one year, was committed to a sexual deviate facility in lieu of a
prison sentence. At the end of his one-year term he was recommitted after a hearing. Humphrey filed
a petition in United States district court challenging the state's refusal to allow him ajury proceeding.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that when a state's civil commitment laws make a jury determi-
nation generally available to persons subject to compulsory commitment, persons committed after
criminal conviction are also entitled to a jury.
Under the Wisconsin law at issue in Humphrey, an individual could be committed if a court or jury
found that he was mentally ill and a proper subject for custody and treatment. Id. at 509 n.4. This
standard was the same one at issue in the Lessard case. In dicta, the Supreme Court stated that
Wisconsin law conditioned confinement "not solely on the medical judgment that the defendant is
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ancing test: the state's interest in confinement must outweigh the individ-
ual's interest in liberty before she can be committed. 31
The Lessard court found that in order to establish a sufficient state in-
terest in confinement, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) the individual is mentally ill, (2) there is an extreme likelihood that the
individual will do immediate harm to herself or others if not confined, and
(3) the likelihood has been evidenced by a "recent overt act, attempt, or
threat to do substantial harm" to herself or another. 32 The Lessard court
did not define "extreme likelihood" or "immediate harm." It did not
indicate how recent and severe the "overt act," "attempt," or "threat"
must be, or what comprises "substantial harm." Nevertheless, the Les-
sard standards remain among the most specific and stringent required by
the courts. Most courts have followed the Lessard court's example in
holding that strict standards and thorough procedures are necessary to en-
sure protection of the mentally ill individual's rights. 33
Problems have arisen, however, in defining the standards, deciding
what types of procedural safeguards are due, and trying to balance medi-
cal, social, and legal considerations. The United States Supreme Court
has provided little help in resolving these problems. Subsequent to Les-
sard, the Supreme Court suggested that dangerousness is the proper stan-
dard in civil commitment proceedings. 34 However, it has never specifi-
mentally ill and treatable but also on the social and legal judgment that his potential for doing harm,
to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty." Id. at 509.
The "massive curtailment of liberty" language in Humphrey is widely quoted and referred to as if
it were the Court's holding. It was in fact the Wisconsin federal district court and not the United
States Supreme Court which held that commitment was contingent on finding an individual's poten-
tial for danger great enough to justify the massive curtailment of liberty commitment entails.
31. 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981); Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173
(9th Cir. 1980); Luna v. Van Zandt, 554 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F.
Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Lynch v.
Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085
(E.D. Mich. 1974).
34. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). O'Connor was the first civil commitment
case the Court reviewed. In O'Connor, a nondangerous man, committed for 15 years, had been
refused release despite the offers of friends to provide for him. The Court held that a state "cannot
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members and friends." Id. at
576.
These statements are widely interpreted to mean that some degree of dangerousness is necessary in
order for commitment standards to meet constitutional requirements. However, the case provides
little guidance on the dangerousness issue because the decision is so closely tied to the O'Connor
facts. The Court explicitly refused to decide if a state could compulsorily confine a nondangerous
mentally ill person solely for purposes of treatment. Id. at 573. It also refused to determine how
dangerous an individual must be to justify commitment. See id. at 575.
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cally considered the degree of dangerousness required for commitment.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has said that the mentally ill can-
not be confined involuntarily without due process, 35 it has not indicated
exactly what process is due and when. Instead, it has indicated that the
states have wide discretion in setting standards and procedures so long as
the state standards and procedures meet the constitutional minimum, 36 as
determined by the Mathews v. Eldridge37 balancing test.
Since the Lessard decision, the trend nationwide has been to limit the
justifications for commitment, forcing states to bear a greater burden of
proof and to provide more adequate safeguards against mistake. A major-
ity of the states have revised their statutes to require a showing of danger-
ousness and procedural due process before commitment. 38 In addition,
most federal courts that have heard commitment cases have adopted the
dangerousness standard in some form or another and required procedural
due process for commitment. 39
B. Involuntary Commitment in Washington
Washington followed the national trend toward reform of involuntary
35. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425 (1979): O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563. 580
(1974) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
36. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
37. The Court has indicated that the proper test to use to determine the constitutional minimum is
the test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews v. Eldridge test in-
volves balancing three factors:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest.
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
For use of the Mathews v. Eldridge test in other civil commitment cases, see, for example. Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979); Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1981), Luna
v. Van Zandt, 554 F. Supp. 68, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
38. For a listing of statutes as of 1982, see B. BEis, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 297-321
(1984).
39. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) (extreme likelihood that an individ-
ual will do immediate and substantial harm to himself or others as evidenced by a recent overt act,
attempt, or threat); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976) (serious threat to them-
selves or others as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt, or threat); Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp.
905 (D.N.J. 1976) (if not committed, patient would be a probable danger to himself or the commu-
nity): Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975) (a mentally ill person who poses a
serious threat of substantial harm to himself and to others as evidenced by a recent overt act or threat);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (person must be mentally ill and pose a real
and present threat of substantial harm to himself or to others as evidenced by a recent overt act); Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (mentally ill and presents an
imminent threat of physical harm to himself or others). Each of these courts adopted a full panoply of
procedural rights, also.
380
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commitment procedures with its 1973 decision in In re Levias4o and its
enactment the same year of the Mental Health Act. 41 In In re Levias, the
Washington Supreme Court rejected the parens patriae doctrine as a basis
for involuntary commitment, finding that dangerousness was a prerequi-
site to commitment. 42 The Mental Health Act enacted later that year was
consistent with the Levias court's opinion. Closely patterned after Cali-
fornia's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act,43 the statute's purpose was to ex-
tend the rights of mental patients and to limit the use of involuntary com-
mitment. 44
Under the Washington Mental Health Act, an individual may be com-
mitted only if he (1) poses a substantial risk of serious harm to himself,
others, or the property of others, 45 or (2) is gravely disabled. 46 Civil com-
40. 83 Wn. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973). The Washington Supreme Court held that the state
must prove by clear, convincing, and cogent evidence that an individual is mentally ill and danger-
ous. Id. at 256-58, 517 P.2d at 589. The court reasoned that civil commitment entailed as severe a
deprivation as criminal conviction and therefore required the same due process protection. Id. at 255,
517 P.2d at 589.
41. Mental Health Act, ch. 142, 1973 Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. 1014 (codified as amended at
WASH. REv. CODE ch. 71.05 (1983).
42. 83 Wn. 2d at 257-58, 517 P.2d at 591. The court stated:
[T]he doctrine of parens patriae... can no longer provide an adequate basis for the incarcera-
tion of individuals who have committed no crime, who are able to function reasonably well in
society, and who pose no threat to themselves or others, despite some degree of mental illness.
Since the police power of the state is focused upon securing the safety of its citizenry, neither
logic nor law permits any supportive basis for the involuntary incarceration of persons who are
not unsafe.
Id. at 257, 517 P.2d at 591.
43. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
44. The objectives of the Mental Health Act as laid out in WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.010 (1983)
are:
(1) To end inappropriate, indefinite commitment of mentally disordered persons and to elimi-
nate legal disabilities that arise from such commitment;
(2) To provide prompt evaluation and short term treatment of persons with serious mental
disorders;
(3) To safeguard individual rights;
(4) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental disorders;
(5) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional personnel, and public funds
to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary expenditures;
(6) To encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be provided within the community.
45. Id. §§ 71.05.150(a), .240, .280(l)-(3).
Section 71.05.020(3) defines "likelihood of serious harm" as:
(a) A substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon his own per-
son, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit suicide or inflict physical harm on one's self,
(b) a substantial risk that physical harm will be inflicted by an individual upon another, as evi-
denced by behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in
reasonable fear of sustaining such harm, or (c) a substantial risk that physical harm will be
inflicted by an individual upon the property of others, as evidenced by behavior which has
caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others.
Subsection 3(c) of WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.020 was added in 1979. An act relating to civil
commitment, ch. 215, sec. 5, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1872, 1876. Before that time, damage
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mitment under the Act occurs in three stages. The first stage is seventy-
two-hour detention for evaluation and treatment. 47 Commitment can oc-
cur at that stage either on an emergency basis or under the summons pro-
cedure without a hearing. 48 Within seventy-two hours after detention, the
individual is entitled to a full judicial hearing to determine whether he
presents a likelihood of serious harm to himself or to others or is gravely
to property was not a cause for commitment. It is unclear whether it would withstand judicial scrutiny
after the decision in Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980), rejecting as cause for commit-
ment the broad standard, any harm to any property. Arguably, the substantial loss or damage require-
ment would not be subject to the overbreadth problem the Suzuki court found with the Hawaii statute.
See infra note 59.
46. WASH REV CODE §§ 71.05.150(l)(a), .240, .280(4) (1983).
The second standard for commitment is "gravely disabled" which is defined in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.020() (1983) as:
a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) Is in danger of serious physical
harm resulting from a failure to provide for his essential human needs of health or safety, or (b)
manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss
of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is
essential for his or her health or safety.
Subsection (1)(b) of § 71.05.020 was added in 1979 in response to widespread discontent with the
severe restrictions to commitment under the 1974 Mental Health Act. An act relating to civil commit-
ment, ch. 215, sec. 5, 1979 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1872, 1875. Under subsection (1)(b),
"gravely disabled" is a medical definition and allows commitment of individuals found mentally ill
who have fallen below a previously established plateau, often because they have stopped taking their
medication. For an eloquent defense of the need for a medical standard of commitment, see Zusman,
The Need for Intervention: the Reasons for State Control of the Mentally Disordered, in C. WARREN.
supra note 16, at 110-33.
47. WASH REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1983). These provisions cover both emergency and non-
emergency 72-hour detention and specify the exact procedure to be followed. Anyone who files a
petition may initiate non-emergency commitment, although the decision to commit rests with the
mental health official. The official can be any person with training in the field of human behavior and
authorized by the state to recommend commitment. Id. § 71.05.020(11). In King County, this indi-
vidual is seldom a psychiatrist, although he holds a masters degree in either psychology or social
work. Lecture by James Stevenson, King County Mental Health Professional, University of Wash-
ington Experimental College (April 23, 1983) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
Police officers may take anyone they believe presents an imminent danger because of mental ill-
ness into custody and deliver him to a mental health facility. Those detained, however, must be
examined by a mental health official within three hours. In California, about one-half of those invo-
luntarily committed were initially detained by police. C. WARREN. supra note 16, at 24. Figures are
not available for Washington.
48. WASH REV CODE § 71.05.150 (1983). The non-emergency summons procedure, described
in WASH REV CODE § 71.05.150(l)(a) (1983) is the part of the statute challenged by Ms. Harris.
Under § 71.05.150(l)(a), when a mental health professional receives information about a potentially
dangerous, mentally disordered person, that professional must investigate and evaluate the facts al-
leged and the reliability and credibility of the reporting person. He may then issue a summons to the
mentally ill person, requiring her to appear within 24 hours for evaluation and treatment. Should the
person fail or refuse to appear within 24 hours, the mental health official may authorize the police to
pick up the person and detain her involuntarily. Id. § 71.05.150(l)(d). Although initially the mental
health officer exercises his own discretion in determining if the individual meets the commitment
standards, within 72 hours of detention the person is entitled to a full probable cause hearing. Id. §
71.05.200( l)(a).
Involuntary Mental Commitment
disabled.49 If he is found dangerous or gravely disabled, the county may
detain him for fourteen days for further treatment and evaluation. 50 An-
other judicial hearing is required if the county wishes to detain him be-
yond fourteen days. 51 Further hearings are required every ninety days
thereafter, for as long as confinement continues. 52
II. THE HARRIS COURT'S REASONING
The Harris court's goal was to conform the "law of involuntary civil
commitment to the requirements of the constitution. 53 In its attempt to
accomplish this, the court considered the commitment standard for Wash-
ington's Mental Health Act and declared the procedure for non-emer-
gency, seventy-two-hour commitment unconstitutional. While recogniz-
ing inherent problems, 54 the court decided not to abandon the
dangerousness standard. Instead, the court interpreted it to require evi-
dence of both a substantial danger of serious harm and a recent overt
act. 55
By choosing not to require a standard of "imminent danger," the court
declined to follow the 1980 decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Suzuki v. Yuen 56 that "imminent danger"
was a constitutionally mandated standard. The Washington court rejected
the Suzuki standard for five reasons. First, as the Washington statute is
drafted, "imminence" is required only under the emergency detention
procedure. 57 The court therefore assumed that the legislature knew how
to require "imminence" when it wanted to and did not intend to require it
49. Id. § 71.05.180.
50. Id. § 71.05.240.
51. Id. § 71.05.280.
52. Id.
53. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 281, 654 P.2d at 111.
54. Id. at 280-81,654 P.2d at I I1.
55. Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
56. 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980). The Suzuki litigation extended over four years. In Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976), the district court declared the new Hawaii mental
health code unconstitutional because it permitted commitment without proof of dangerousness. An
individual could be committed if two physicians found him to be mentally ill or addicted to alcohol or
drugs. Furthermore, the statute provided inadequate procedural protection. The judge retained juris-
diction pending revision of the Hawaii commitment law. In Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D.
Hawaii 1977), the same district judge found the amended act unconstitutional because it allowed
commitment of an individual proven dangerous to property and because the dangerousness standard
did not require the finding of a recent act, attempt, or threat of imminent danger. 438 F. Supp. at
1110. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this holding, but its opinion seems to narrow the holding somewhat
by suggesting that protection of property might sometimes be a weighty enough state interest to jus-
tify commitment. The court found the Hawaii statute was overly broad because it allowed commit-
ment for any damage to "any property." Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d at 176.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(2) (1983).
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for all commitments. 58 Second, the United States Supreme Court has not
determined the degree of dangerousness required. For this reason, the
Washington court concluded that the Suzuki standard was not constitu-
tionally mandated. 59 Third, other courts have considered the question of
commitment standards and have not required imminence. 6° Fourth, re-
lease of persons who present a substantal risk of harm might be required
under an "imminent danger" standard because once they are in custody
they would no longer present an imminent danger. 61 Fifth, if imminence
were required for all civil commitments, mental health officials who feel
commitment is necessary would dilute the "imminence standard" by in-
corporating it into the "substantial likelihood" standard. 62
In addition to defining the dangerousness standard, the Harris court
interjected the courts between mental health officials and allegedly men-
tally ill individuals at the first stage of the commitment process. The Har-
ris decision requires that before a summons is issued, a judge must deter-
mine that (I) the person is a substantial danger to himself or others as
evidenced by a recent overt act, (2) the mental health official has con-
ducted an adequate investigation, and (3) there is no reasonable alterna-
tive to requiring the person to appear for evaluation and treatment. 63
The court's analysis of the commitment procedure follows the ap-
proach set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.64 The Harris court worked
through the balancing test and found that the individual interests affected
by the summons were substantial and the risk of erroneous deprivation
was great. 65 Not only was the commitment standard inaccurate and prob-
lematic to apply, but the summons procedure itself was flawed for two
reasons: (1) the statute provided for no review of the mental health profes-
sional's decision to commit, 66 and (2) the statute did not require the men-
tal health professional to exhaust all alternatives other than commit-
ment. 67
The court then considered the counterweights in the balancing test and
concluded that the state lacked adequate justification for permitting men-
58. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 284-85, 654 P.2d at 113. This interpretation of the dangerousness
standard would apply to all levels of commitment in the state of Washington, although it would
presumably not modify the standard for commitment under the gravely disabled standard.
59. Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
60. Id. at 283, 654 P.2d at 112.
61. Id. at 284, 654 P.2d at 113.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 287-88, 654 P.2d at 115.
64. Id. at 285, 654 P.2d at 113 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). For a
description of the test, see supra note 37.
65. 98 Wn. 2d at 285,654 P.2d at 114.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 286, 654 P.2d at 114.
Vol. 59:375, 1984
Involuntary Mental Commitment
tal health officials to detain individuals without some check on the offi-
cials' discretion. 68 The court found that a judge is uniquely qualified to
make decisions regarding the fairness and thoroughness of the standards
and procedures that the mental health officials used in deciding to issue a
summons. 69 Therefore, the court ordered ex parte judicial review of the
commitment decision prior to issuance of a summons.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE HARRIS DECISION
A. Modification of the Dangerousness Standard
The court rejected Ms. Harris' argument that predictions of dangerous-
ness are so inaccurate that the state can never meet its burden of proving
anyone dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. 70 Nevertheless, the
court acknowledged that the dangerousness standard presents serious
problems. 71 These problems have been widely explored by commenta-
tors, courts, and administrators trying to apply civil commitment laws. 72
68. Id. at 286-87, 654 P.2d at 114.
69. Id. at 288, 654 P.2d at 115. The Harris court decided that judges were the appropriate deci-
sionmakers despite the skepticism expressed by the Supreme Court of the appropriateness of judicial
interference in medical decisionmaking. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982); Par-
hamv. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
70. Harris, 98Wn. 2dat281, 654P.2dat 111.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,432 (1979) ("the reasonable doubt standard is
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diag-
nosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet"); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093
(E.D. Wis. 1972) ("attempts to predict future conduct are always difficult, and confinement based
upon such a prediction must always be viewed with suspicion"), vacated and remanded for a more
specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). For an excellent discussion of the dangerousness requirement generally, see
Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 563 (1977). For a review of commentators urging
rejection of the dangerousness standard, see Sadoff, Indications for Involuntary Hospitalization:
Dangerousness or Mental Illness?, in LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONS 297 (1978). For
analysis of the problems with the standard, see E. MAGGIO. THE PSYCHIATRY-LAW DILEMMA 18-23
(1981); Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony; The Fal-
libility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 11, 22-30 (1976); Cocozza &
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evi-
dence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Coleman, "You'll Thank Us Later": Rationalizing Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 4 HAMLiNE L. REv. 425 (1981); Ennis & Litwack, Psychia-
try and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693
(1974); La Fond, supra note 17, at 510-13; Peszke, Is Dangerousness an Issue for Physicians in
Emergency Commitment?, 132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 825 (1975); Developments, supra note 15, at
1222-45.
Many commentators have also noted the laxity of the courts in applying the legal standards. See
Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the Courtroom, 11 LAW & SoC'Y
REv. 651, 665 (1977) ("although court officials are not deferring to psychiatric opinion in the great
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Repeated studies have shown that mental health officials are unable to
accurately predict dangerous behavior. 73 Psychologists notoriously over-
predict dangerousness. 74 The courts, however, have repeatedly held that
commitment cannot be legally justified unless the state has a compelling
interest, and the means used to meet the state's interest are reasonably
related to the state's goals. 75 The courts have generally found that the
state's need to protect its citizens from dangerous, mentally ill people is
compelling. 76 However, commitment is arguably justified only when
there is a high probability that the individual to be committed is in fact
seriously dangerous. To base a commitment decision on probable danger-
ousness when dangerousness cannot be predicted accurately may, as Ms.
Harris suggested, be a violation of substantive due process. Yet the Har-
ris court declined to abandon the dangerousness standard because to do so
would be to "eviscerate the entire law of involuntary commitment." 77
The Harris court, however, tacitly acknowledged potential constitu-
tional problems with the standard. 78 The court appeared to leave the door
majority of contested cases, we still find numerous instances of deference and commitment where a
preponderance of evidence does not support imminent danger to self or others"); Morse, A Prefer-
ence for Libertv: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF
L. REV. 54, 76 (1982) ("[olvercommitment is inevitable [because of] the procedural laxness that
characterizes commitment proceedings nearly everywhere"). After examining 100 habeas corpus
proceedings in a California metropolitan court, Warren concluded that the statutory criteria were not
strictly applied, particularly that the courts were failing to try to predict imminence and seriousness of
danger to others. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The Application of Califor-
nia's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 LAW & Soc'y REV 629, 647 (1977). But see Hiday. Court
Decisions in Civil Commitment: Independence or Deference, 4 INT'L J. LAW & PSYCHIATRY 159
(1981) (a recent study that found courts adhering more closely to statutory commitment standards and
thereby reducing the number of people committed) [hereinafter cited as Hiday, Independence or
Deference].
73. For a review of these studies, see E. MAGGIO. supra note 72, at 18. See also sources cited
supra note 72.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Court held that prisoners committed
to a mental health hospital in lieu of prison could not be held beyond their prison term without another
hearing, stating that "due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738. Accord,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
76. See, e.g.. Luna v. Van Zandt, 554 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417 (W.D. Ky. 1975);
State ex rel. Doe v. Madonna, 295 N.W.2d 356, 365 (Minn. 1980); In re Levias, 83 Wn. 2d 253,
257, 517 P.2d 588, 591 (1973).
77. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 280-81, 654 P.2d at I 11. The court's rejection of Ms. Harris' argu-
ment was predictable. The court was understandably reluctant to abandon the standard apparently
mandated by the United States Supreme Court, see supra note 34, clearly required by the Washington
legislature, see supra note 45, set forth in earlier Washington civil commitment cases, see supra
notes 40-42 and accompanying text, and widely used in other jurisdictions, see supra notes 25-33,
38-39 and accompanying text.
78. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 280-81,654 P.2d at I11.
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open for a future challenge to the standard by dismissing the claim on the
basis of an inadequate record. Presumably, had Ms. Harris presented
more than "a doctor's affidavit and a few articles in the appendix," 79 the
court might have been willing to address the constitutionality of the dan-
gerousness standard, an issue not fully analyzed since the Lessard court
adopted it.80
1. The New Requirementfor a Recent Overt Act
Although the Harris court decided that dangerousness can provide a
basis for commitment, it determined that clear evidence of dangerousness
is necessary to protect the individual. Accordingly, the court interpreted
the legislatively defined standard of dangerousness to require evidence of
a recent overt dangerous act. The court said that the act may be one that
has caused harm or that creates a reasonable apprehension of dangerous-
ness, 81 thereby leaving substantial latitude in the standard. This require-
ment significantly increases the state's evidentiary burden for commit-
ment.
The court's clarification of the standard is a welcome step toward im-
proving the reliability of civil commitments under the "dangerous to oth-
ers" standard. Studies have shown that predictions of dangerousness
based on prior dangerous behavior are somewhat more accurate. 82 The
newly clarified standard will probably not, however, improve the reliabil-
ity of civil commitments based on "dangerousness to self" or verbal
threats. Although most jurisdictions consider threats which create a rea-
sonable apprehension of harm to be overt acts, 83 most studies indicate
that mere threats to commit dangerous acts are not good predictors of
future dangerousness. 84 Nor are dangerous acts or threats of danger to
oneself good predictors of future dangerousness. 85 Thus, the Harris
court's requirement of evidence of a recent overt act will probably im-
prove the reliability of the mental health official's predictions Only in
those cases where there is behavior threatening others. Nevertheless, the
Harris decision brings Washington's standard in line with a number of
79. Id.
80. Although numerous courts adopted the dangerousness standard after Lessard, they merely
adopted the language of the Lessard court instead of providing an independent rationale for their
holdings. See supra note 39.
81. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 284-85, 654 P.2d at 113.
82. See Comment, supra note 72, at 584.
83. See Developments, supra note 15, at 1244; Comment, supra note 72, at 579.
84. Developments, supra note 15, at 1244.
85. Comment, supra note 72, at 585.
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other jurisdictions 86 and, more importantly, indicates the court's concern
that civil commitment be based on tangible evidence reviewable by the
courts.
Despite the potential value of the "recent overt act" requirement, its
practical effect is unclear. The court did not define the word "recent" and
defined "overt act" in broad language only. Thus, the standard remains
quite subjective. Nevertheless, county procedures have varied widely
across the state, 87 so the new clarification of the standard should provide
some uniformity in procedures followed by the mental health officials
throughout the state, and in the courts' review of their decisions.
2. Rejection of the "Imminent Danger" Standard
Loosely interpreted, the "imminent danger" standard which the Har-
ris court rejected would probably not increase reliability in commitment
decisions as much as will the "recent overt act" requirement. The "im-
minent danger" standard is a predictive standard and suffers from the
same inherent inaccuracy as other predictive standards. 88 Strictly inter-
preted, however, the "imminent danger" standard might improve the ac-
curacy of commitment decisions. For example, if the standard were to be
interpreted to mean that the fact-finder must determine that the individual
would commit a dangerous act today, tomorrow, or in the next week, the
imminence standard might provide a fairer and more accurate basis for
committing individuals than the modified dangerousness standard that the
Washington court adopted. 89
Three of the Harris court's five reasons for rejecting the "imminence
standard" have merit, nevertheless. First, requiring imminent dangerous-
ness in all types of commitment proceedings would have altered the struc-
86. Also requiring evidence of a recent overt act are Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir.
1980): Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974): Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972). For a list of statutes. see E. BETS. supra note
38, at 297-321.
87. In King County, the criteria for commitment under the dangerousness standard are (I) harm
to self as evidenced by written or verbal threats to commit suicide or to inflict physical harm to
oneself, (2) harm to others as evidenced by written, verbal, or physical behavior which has caused
harm or places others in a reasonable fear of sustaining harm; or (3) property damage as evidenced by
behavior which has caused substantial loss or damage to the property of others. Lecture by James
Stevenson, supra note 47.
88. See supra notes 73-76.
89. Hiday and Markell found in their study of the courtroom application of the dangerousness
standard that "[r]equiring evidence of recency and frequency to show imminence and likelihood of
dangerousness would reduce the proportion committed to less than one-fifth of respondents." Hiday
& Markell, Components of Dangerousness: Legal Standards in Civil Commitment, 3 INT'L J. LAW &
PSYCHIATRY 405. 416 (1981).
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ture of the Mental Health Act and would have been contrary to the appar-
ent intent of the Washington legislature. As the court noted, the only
section of the Act where the Washington legislature chose to require "im-
minence" was in the provisions pertaining to emergency detention. 90 Ab-
sent a constitutional mandate to the contrary, the court's decision to re-
spect a clear legislative choice is understandable.
Second, an examination of the opinions of the United States Supreme
Court supports the Harris court's conclusion that the Constitution does
not require an imminence standard. The United States Supreme Court has
never articulated the degree of dangerousness required to commit an indi-
vidual. 91 Furthermore, recent cases suggest that the Supreme Court is
moving away from such strict substantive and procedural protections as
those adopted by the Lessard court and later by the Ninth Circuit in Su-
zuki. 92 These Supreme Court cases reject some of the basic premises on
which the Lessard and Suzuki courts based their arguments. 93 By under-
mining these premises, the Supreme Court draws into question the con-
90. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.150(2) (1983). Had the court decided to require evidence of im-
minent dangerousness in all commitment proceedings, as urged by Ms. Harris, the distinction be-
tween the emergency and non-emergency detention standards, which the legislature deliberately cre-
ated, would disappear. Moreover, the rationale for the non-emergency summons procedure would
also disappear because it makes no sense to allow an individual to wander around for several days
pending issuance of and response to a summons if she is likely to harm someone at any moment.
91. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
92. Compare Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (adopting a clear and convincing burden
of proof) with Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (adopting a beyond a
reasonable doubt burden), vacated and remanded for a more specific order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974),
order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
421 U.S. 957 (1975), order reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Compare
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) and Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (a
medical decisionmaker is as qualified as, if not more qualified than, a judge to make commitment
decisions) with Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1091 (requiring a judge). But see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (holding that a prisoner was entitled to a hearing before he was transferred to a mental
hospital because the conditions and degree of confinement in a mental hospital are greater than those
imposed by a prison sentence and the chance of error in commitment is so great).
93. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected the Lessard
holding that the same evidentiary standard is required in civil commitment cases as is required in
criminal cases. The Court based its decision partly on its finding that civil commitment is not closely
analogous to criminal conviction. Id. at 428-29. The Court held that "the reasonable doubt standard
is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diag-
nosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to
needed medical treatment." Id. at 432.
The Court reasoned that legal procedure is only one of the protections available to the mentally ill.
It also acknowledged that the uncertainties of psychiatry make it virtually impossible to prove danger-
ousness beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 432. Acknowledging that the standard of proof allocates
the burden between litigants, the Court stated: "The heavy standard applied in criminal cases mani-
fests our concern that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized even at the risk that some
who are guilty might go free .... [But] it cannot be said ... that it is much better for a mentally ill
person to 'go free' than for a mentally normal person to be committed." Id. at 428-29 (citations
omitted).
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clusions based on them, including the conclusion that only imminent dan-
gerousness can justify commitment. 94
Third, as the Harris court correctly concluded, the refusal of other
courts to adopt the imminence standard is a further indication that "immi-
nence" is not constitutionally mandated. 95 The Supreme Court has stated
that each state is free to determine its own standards for civil commitment
as long as the standards meet the constitutional minimum. 96 The Wash-
ington court's choice not to adopt the more stringent standards established
in Lessard and Suzuki appears to be a matter within its discretion, given
the absence of a clear mandate from the Supreme Court.
The Harris court's fourth and fifth reasons for rejecting the imminence
standard are less persuasive than the other three. The fourth concern the
court expressed was that to require imminence for all commitments might
prevent the state from continuing to detain potentially dangerous individ-
uals. Obviously, the "imminence" requirement refers to the danger
which would exist if the individual were not restrained. Therefore, requir-
ing "imminence" does not promote the immediate release of dangerous
people.
The court also expressed concern that mental health officials might di-
lute the imminent danger standard, if it were required at all levels of com-
mitment, by "assimilating" it with the "substantial risk of harm" stan-
dard. 97 Analysis based on the assumption that administering officials will
misapply the standard is always suspect. Since the court has concluded
that "imminence" is not a constitutionally mandated standard, it should
94. The Lessard court's analogy of commitment to conviction was echoed in a number of other
courts. See, e.g., Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1092 (E.D. Mich. 1974);
Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 972 (M.D. Pa. 1971); In re Levias, 83 Wn. 2d 253, 255,
517 P.2d 588, 590 (1973). But see Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp 905, 912 (D.N.J. 1976). For critical
discussions of the analogy between commitment and conviction, see Aronson, Should the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN L. REV 55,
73-80 (1973); Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE L. REV I
(1977); Developments, supra note 15, at 1265-1313.
95. For cases not requiring "imminence," see, for example, Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp.
439, 451 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976); Kendall v. True, 391
F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1096 (E.D.
Mich. 1974). Courts that require an "imminent threat," "present threat," or "immediate threat"
include Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Dixon
v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). The Harris court cited Doremus and
Dixon as not having an imminence requirement. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 283, 654 P.2d at 112. How-
ever, they require immediate or present danger, which most commentators classify as an imminence
requirement.
96. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
97. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 284,654 P.2d at 113.
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have chosen to reject it on the grounds of social policy,9 8 not on the pre-
sumption that officials would misapply the law if the court decides other-
wise.
The Harris court's decision not to adopt the imminence standard is a
compromise position. The court attempted to balance the recent state
trend towards relaxing commitment standards 99 against the court's recog-
nition of the importance of the rights of the mentally ill. Studies as to
whether courts effectively apply the imminence requirement are conflict-
ing. 100 Also, policy issues as to the proper balance among the medical,
social, and legal concerns of civil commitment are unresolved. There-
fore, the Washington court's reluctance to increase the commitment stan-
dard is a realistic response to these unresolved problems. Nevertheless,
the court's decision to require that dangerousness be proven by a recent
overt act should significantly increase the protection afforded the men-
tally ill. 101
B. Unconstitutionality of the Summons Procedure
In addition to tightening and clarifying the substantive requirements for
commitment, the Harris court declared the summons procedure under
section 71.05.150 of the Washington Revised Code unconstitutional. The
court decided that a judge must review a summons before it is issued. 102
The court thereby supplemented the ex parte decisionmaking by the
county-designated mental health official with ex parte judicial review of
all non-emergency involuntary commitments. I03 The court's decision
98. The court could have reached the same result more reasonably by acknowledging that current
social policy supports the right of the state to commit people who are considered substantially danger-
ous.
99. The trend towards relaxing standards was evident in the 1979 amendments to the Washington
Mental Health Act. In 1979, the legislature added provisions allowing commitment for danger to
property and added a new subcategory to the gravely disabled category. See supra notes 45-46.
100. Although a recent study by Hiday indicates that the courts may be applying the imminence
standard with more diligence than earlier studies suggested, Hiday, Independence or Deference, su-
pra note 72, thereby reducing the number of commitments, many other studies have reached different
conclusions, see supra note 72. An earlier study by Hiday and Markell based on observation in North
Carolina courts found, however, that if "imminent dangerousness" were defined to be an assault or
threat to assault that has occurred within one week of the petition for commitment, only 23.9% of the
petitions filed cited adequate evidence on their face. They also found that requiring evidence of re-
cency and frequency of harmful behavior would reduce the number of individuals committed to less
than one-fifth of respondents. Hiday & Markell, supra note 89, at 411. See also Warren, supra note
72.
101. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
102. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 287,654 P.2d at 114.
103. In January 1983, just weeks after the Harris decision, the Washington Senate Judiciary
Committee passed an amendment to WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.150. Substitute S. 3181, 48th Leg.
(1983) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). This bill passed the Washington Senate in
1983 and passed the Washington House in 1984 with amendments. At the time this Note went to
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thus decreased the discretionary powers of the mental health officials.
These changes will probably result in a decrease in the number of men-
tally ill individuals committed in Washington. 104
The court, however, did not fully address some of the problems with ex
parte review. First, the court failed to give full consideration to the pre-
hearing detention issue. Second, the court did not adequately discuss the
practical problems inherent in its solution. Third, the court failed to dis-
cuss the impact of its decision on those committed as "gravely disabled."
1. Decision Not to Require a Pre-Detention Hearing
The King County Superior Court's refusal to conduct a pre-detention,
show cause hearing was the issue on review, 105 yet the Harris court ad-
dressed the pre-detention hearing issue only in a footnote. 106 Its failure to
give the issue full analysis raises substantive due process problems with
its remedy.
As the Harris court noted, even a short, seventy-two-hour commitment
is a massive curtailment of an individual's liberty. 107 Since civil commit-
ment threatens a fundamental liberty interest, due process protection is
required. 108 To determine what process is due in civil commitment cases,
the Supreme Court has indicated that the accepted approach is the Ma-
thews v. Eldridge balancing test. 109 Although the opinion provides no ex-
plicit analysis, the Harris court apparently used the balancing test to de-
press, a senate committee had rejected the house amendments and returned the bill to the house where
it was awaiting further action.
The bill incorporates most of the Harris holdings:
(I) A judge is required to review the petition for initial detention and issue an order requiring the
allegedly mentally ill person to appear not less than 24 hours after service of the order for not more
than a 72-hour evaluation and treatment period.
(2) The mental health official is required to interview the individual before filing a petition unless
the individual refuses to be interviewed.
(3) The mental health official must determine whether the individual will voluntarily accept appro-
priate treatment before filing the petition.
(4) The order must indicate whether the evaluation will be on an inpatient or outpatient basis,
although it does not require that the judge review this determination nor does it delineate standards or
require the county to develop standards for determining when inpatient care is necessary.
104. For a study on how requiring recent, frequent, and severe dangerous acts decreases the
percentage of individuals committed, see Hiday & Markell, supra note 89.
105. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 278,654 P.2d at 110.
106. Id. at 289 n.3,654 P.2d at 115 n.3.
107. Id. at 285,654 P.2d at 112.
108. Id. at 279, 654 P.2d at 110. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,491-92 (1980); Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1974) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731 (1972); In re Quesnell, 83 Wn. 2d
224, 230, 517 P.2d 568, 572-73 (1973); In re Levias, 83 Wn.2d 253, 255, 517 P.2d 588. 590
(1973).
109. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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termine that the state's interest in compelling a psychiatric evaluation
outweighs the individual's liberty interest. The Harris court stated, in a
footnote following the opinion, that the state's interest in meeting the bur-
den of proof in the fourteen-day commitment hearing justifies a short de-
tention period without a hearing even when no emergency exists. 110
The state would have more difficulty meeting its burden of proof in the
fourteen-day commitment hearing if it could not involuntarily detain indi-
viduals for evaluation. In fact, the Harris court determined that the state
might never be able to meet its burden of proof without a compelled eval-
uation.Ill Therefore, the state may have a substantial enough interest in
committing those deemed dangerous to justify a compulsory psychologi-
cal evaluation.
The court never explained, however, why the state's need for a com-
pelled psychological evaluation justifies a seventy-two-hour, pre-hearing
detention. Few evaluations would require seventy-two hours, yet neither
the statute nor the court requires that the detention period be limited to the
actual time spent in evaluation. A detention period limited to the actual
time spent in evaluation would infringe less on the individual's liberty
interest while meeting the state's need to prepare its case for the fourteen-
day commitment hearing. 112 Furthermore, limiting the detention period to
the time consumed by evaluation would satisfy the substantive due pro-
cess requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court. 113
If the detention period were limited to the time needed for evaluation,
the county could apply to the judge for a summons. If approved, the
110. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 289 n.3, 654 P.2d at 115 n.3. Other courts have found a sufficient
state interest to justify commitment without a hearing. However, most courts seem to assume that
initial confinement is an emergency confinement and so discuss hearing requirments only after emer-
gency detention. See, e.g., Coil v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D.N.J. 1976) (if two physicians
certify that the individual would be dangerous if she remained at large, she may be held for up to 20
days without a hearing; the court did not distinguish between emergency and non-emergency deten-
tion); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (must hold a preliminary hearing
within five days of detention; no distinction was made between emergency and non-emergency deten-
tion); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1098 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (may detain
individual for up to five days if there is probable cause to believe confinement is necessary); Fhagen
v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 355, 278 N.E.2d 615, 618, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (upon certification of
two physicians, person may be held up to 15 days before a full hearing, apparently only when the
state has a compelling interest), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). See also Doe v. Gallinot, 657
F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 1981); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
111. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 289 n.3,654 P.2d at 115 n.3.
112. A more closely tailored detention period would meet the standard set by the United States
Supreme Court in several decisons regarding the rights of the mentally ill. See supra note 75.
113. The importance of minimizing the detention time is emphasized by the facts of the Harris
case. Had Ms. Harris not gone into hiding, she could have been involuntarily detained for six days
because the statute excludes weekends and holidays for the purpose of determining which days com-
prise the authorized 72-hour period. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 286, 654 P.2d at 114. See WASH. REV.
CODE§ 71.05.180 (1983).
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county could contact the individual and schedule an evaluation time
within the twenty-four-hour period mandated by the existing statute. If
the person failed to appear at the evaluation, 14 the police would be autho-
rized to take the person into custody when the hospital was ready to con-
duct an evaluation and to release him when the evaluation was com-
plete. 115 If the evaluation indicates that the person is unlikely to come to
the fourteen-day commitment hearing scheduled after the evaluation or is,
in fact, imminently dangerous, the burden should be on the state to show
that further custodial detention is justified. 116
Furthermore, the court never discussed why the state's need to meet its
burden of proof justifies submitting the individual to compulsory drug
treatment without a hearing."i7 The seventy-two-hour commitment en-
compasses treatment as well as evaluation. 118 Therefore, an individual
committed for seventy-two hours could be subjected to compulsory drug
treatment without any right to refuse it or any independent determination
that treatment was necessary.1 9 Only by limiting the pre-hearing deten-
114. Although the state might argue that this would waste hospital time, only about seven per-
cent of those committed between 1977 and 1981 in Washington were summoned. Durham & Carr,
Use of the Summons in Involuntary Civil Commitment 12 (January 1984) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review). Therefore, the impact of missed appointments would be slight; further-
more, there would be many emergency and voluntary commitments that could fill those appointment
slots. Balanced against the individual's liberty interest, the administrative burden would be compara-
tively small.
115. The state already has a statute providing that a person is to be returned home by the police if
he does not meet the commitment criteria. See WASH. REV CODE § 71.05.190 (1983).
116. The state could meet this burden by showing at either an informal hearing or through a
judicial ex parte proceeding that the individual had to be detained to prevent flight or imminent harm.
These procedures should occur within a few hours of the decision to detain the person. Arguably,
these protections should also be added to the emergency procedures currently in effect but not at issue
in the Harris case.
Washington Substitute Senate Bill 3181, supra note 103, permits an individual ordered for evalua-
tion and treatment to remain at home or in a place of his choice until the evaluation. A friend, advi-
sor, relative, personal physician, or attorney may accompany him to the evaluation. The senate ver-
sion of the bill allows the individual to decide who will be present during the evaluation, while the
house version requires the treatment facility's permission for a third party to be present at the evalua-
tion. The bill does not suggest, however, that the person be released immediately after evaluation,
and seems to assume that the judicial determination that he needs to report for evaluation justifies
detention for 72 hours.
117. Almost all "treatment" in mental hospitals today is drug therapy rather than talk therapy.
C. WARREN. supra note 16, at 33.
118. See WASH REV CODE § 71.05.150 (1983). This statutory provision is titled "Detention of
mentally disordered persons for evaluation and treatment-Procedure."
119. In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Supreme Court heard a case challenging the
right of the state to force drugs on involuntarily committed patients. The Court reached no decision
because the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had decided a case, after certiorari had been
granted, finding that under the United States Constitution and the common law of Massachusetts a
patient had a right to refuse treatment. The Supreme Court remanded the Mills case to the court of
appeals to consider the effect of the intervening state decision.
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tion period to the time actually consumed by evaluation and by banning
the use of compulsory drug treatment during the pre-hearing, non-emer-
gency detention can the state's interest justify committing an individual
without a hearing.
2. The Practical Effects of Judicial Review
The court not only failed to fully address the pre-detention hearing is-
sue; it also left unexplored some of the practical ramifications of its deci-
sion. Requiring judicial review of the summons adds at least twenty-four
hours to the commitment procedure. 120 In King County, the Harris ruling
resulted in abandonment of the summons procedure for about five
months. 121 In smaller counties, where there is less timely access to judi-
cial review, the extra procedural requirements could conceivably lead to
permanent abandonment of the summons procedure. Although the Harris
court apparently concluded that protection of individual interests justified
the extra procedural steps, the court might have accomplished the same
purpose by abolishing the summons procedure. Apparently the court did
not do so because it found that the state has an interest in committing
those who are not imminently dangerous. Nevertheless, the practical ef-
fect of its decision could be the same.
Should county officials continue to use the summons procedure as
modified by the Harris court, judicial review will clearly add protection
that was previously lacking. The degree of the protection added, how-
ever, depends upon how effectively a judge can function within the limits
of ex parte review. For example, the Harris court'charged the judge with
determining "not only that probable dangerousness exists, but that suffi-
cient investigation has occurred, and that commitment is the least restric-
tive alternative." 122 The court did not delineate what constitutes "suffi-
cient investigation." The existing statute requires the mental health
Washington Substitute Senate Bill 3181, supra note 103, makes no distinction between authoriza-
tion for evaluation and authorization for treatment.
120. Interview with Mike Leake, Administrative Assistant, King County Department of Involun-
tary Commitment (February 1983) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
121. On June 1, 1983, King County resumed using the summons procedure following new
guidelines designed to conform with the Harris court mandate. After the county mental health official
interviews the individual and if she feels the 72-hour detention is necessary, she files a petition with
the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney then presents the petition to a judge, who reviews
the information and issues the summons if he deems it proper. A mental health official then serves the
summons and the individual has 24 hours to report for evaluation and treatment. If she fails to report,
then the police are authorized to take her into custody. Interview with Mike Leake, Administrative
Assistant, King County Department of Involuntary Commitment (February 10, 1984) (notes on file
with the Washington Law Review).
122. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 287-88,654 P.2d at 115.
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official to investigate the facts alleged and the reliability and credibility of
the persons initiating commitment. 123 The court implied that the mental
health official should personally interview the individual to be commit-
ted. 124 It also required that the alleged dangerousness be evidenced by a
recent overt act. 125 The reviewing judge can adequately evaluate the ac-
curacy of the evidence in each of these areas on an ex parte basis.
More difficult to evaluate on an ex parte basis, however, is whether
seventy-two-hour commitment is the least restrictive alternative. The stat-
ute requires that the mental health official determine whether inpatient or
outpatient evaluation is appropriate before issuing the summons. 126 Un-
less the courts require county agencies to establish clear guidelines as to
which conditions require inpatient evaluation, the judges will have trou-
ble evaluating the mental health official's decision independently to deter-
mine if a summons is the least restrictive alternative. Because inpatient
evaluation is more convenient for the county, the tendency will be to or-
der it in borderline cases. Ex parte review of this decision may not pro-
vide adequate protection.
The Harris court also implied that the mental health official should en-
courage the patient to consent to voluntary treatment before issuing a
summons. 127 How a judge can effectively evaluate the official's efforts to
encourage voluntary treatment is unclear. 128 Although the judiciary has
effectively determined whether administering officials have used the least
restrictive alternative in other areas of law, the lack of reviewable treat-
ment guidelines here will make it difficult for the judge to be effective on
an ex parte basis in the commitment area. The court's insistence on use of
the least restrictive alternative is important, however, in that it empha-
sizes the need to protect the rights of the mentally ill.
The effectiveness of the protection afforded by judicial review depends
largely on the independence of the judicial review. If pre-summons judi-
cial review is a rubber stamp routine, the delay and costs will outweigh
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(l)(a) (1983).
124. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 286, 654 P.2d at 114.
Washington Substitute Senate Bill 3181. supra note 103. codifies this requirement.
125. Harris, 98Wn. 2dat284,654P.2dat 113.
Washington Substitute Senate Bill 3181, supra note 103, does not modify the statutory definition
of dangerous to require evidence of a recent overt act.
126. WASH REV CODE § 71.05.150(I)(a) (1983).
127. Harris, 98Wn. 2dat286,654P.2dat 114.
Washington Substitute Senate Bill 318 1, supra note 103, codifies this requirement.
128. Furthermore, encouraging voluntary commitment may put the mentally ill individual in the
position of providing evidence that could be used against her at a later commitment hearing unless the
fact that she consented to voluntary commitment is excluded. Prior hospitalization is the most com-
monly used evidence in commitment hearings. See C. WARREN. supra note 16, at 163-76 (factors
influencing judges in commitment hearings); Aronson, supra note 94, at 63-66 (evidence problems).
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the protection it affords. Commentators are divided on the amount of in-
dependent judgment that the judiciary exercises in commitment deci-
sions. Early studies showed substantial judicial deference to psychiatric
decisions in involuntary commitment hearings. 129 A more recent study
suggests that the high correlation between judges and psychiatrists on
commitment decisions may be due not to rubber stamping but to indepen-
dent decisionmaking based on evidence presented at the commitment
hearing. 130 Whether the judge maintains the same degree of independence
in an ex parte paper process is less certain. To ensure maximum judicial
independence, the court should have either delineated standards against
which a reviewing judge could test the summons to see if it was the least
restrictive alternative or directed the administering agency to develop
these standards.
3. Effect ofEx Parte Review on Commitment of the Gravely Disabled
The summons procedure is most widely used to commit those alleged
to be gravely disabled. 13 Although the Harris court did not directly ad-
dress the commitment of the gravely disabled, its decision will have the
greatest impact on this group because it mandates a change in the entire
summons procedure. Yet ex parte judicial review before summons may
be least effective for the gravely disabled.
Whether to issue a summons for an individual who is gravely disabled
is primarily a medical, not a legal, decision. 132 No easily reviewable, ob-
jective standard exists to identify individuals committable under the
Washington statute as gravely disabled. Consequently, grave disability is
the standard under which people who are considered nuisances or socially
undesirable could most easily be committed, even though they are no
threat to society. 133 This is the group most in need of legal protection.
129. For a list of such studies, see Hiday, Independence or Deference, supra note 72, at 160
nn.2 & 3.
130. Hiday, Independence or Deference, supra note 72, at 169. As Hiday suggests in her study,
the fact that both a judge and a psychiatrist agree on commitment decisions does not necessarily mean
that the judge is rubber stamping psychiatric decisions. It may mean that through different processes,
they have come to the same conclusion. Id. at 162-66.
131. From 1977 to 1981 in King and Pierce Counties, 74.1% of those commited under the sum-
mons procedure were classified as gravely disabled and 41.9% were classified as dangerous to others.
Durham & Carr, supra note 114, at 17. Often more than one reason for commitment was cited, so
people were committed under several standards. This suggests that even a stringent dangerousness
standard can often be bypassed by using the less stringent grave disability standard.
132. See supra note 46.
133. A recent study conducted in King and Pierce Counties indicates that 62.5% of those sum-
moned exhibited bizarre behavior, 38.1% exhibited deterioration of cognitive and volitional func-
tions, 45.9% were in jeopardy for their health and safety, and 43.2% showed violent behavior. Dur-
ham & Carr, supra note 114, at 15. More than one characteristic appeared in many individuals which
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Unfortunately, however, this is the group for whom the Harris remedy
provides the least protection. Although the Harris court requires the
judge to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence of grave disability before
issuing a summons, the medical nature of this evidence and the lack of
clear, reviewable criteria for commitment under the grave disability stan-
dard make meaningful review very difficult. Review of grave disability is
especially hard when the judge is acting ex parte and so has no opportu-
nity to observe and question the person to be committed.
An informal pre-detention hearing may be necessary to protect the
rights of the gravely disabled. At the very least, reviewing judges should
require mental health officials to provide objective evidence of grave di-
sability and should scrutinize that evidence carefully to counterbalance
the inherent difficulties of ex parte review under the grave disability stan-
dard. 134
IV. CONCLUSION
The Harris decision reaffirmed the Washington Supreme Court's dedi-
cation to preserving the individual rights of the mentally ill. The clarifica-
tion of the dangerousness standard by requiring evidence of a recent overt
act should increase the accuracy of commitment decisions of mental
health officials and will provide courts with a more concrete standard of
review. Although the requirement that a judge review any summons be-
fore it is issued may be so burdensome that the summons procedure will
be abandoned, 135 the added protection it provides the mentally ill individ-
ual from unnecessary civil commitment justifies the administrative bur-
den it presents. Judicial review will, however, provide less protection for
those determined to be gravely disabled unless reviewing judges require
substantial, objective evidence before issuing a summons.
The Harris court failed to resolve three basic issues. First, the court did
not decide whether using a dangerousness standard is constitutionally
valid, leaving open the possibility of a future challenge of that standard.
Second, the court did not require'that the detention period be limited to
the time necessary to perform a psychological evaluation. Third, the court
did not specify what steps the judge must take to ensure that seventy-two-
hour commitment is the least restrictive alternative. Because the court
suggests that even with a strong dangerousness standard, it is still relatively easy to commit an indi-
vidual under the gravely disabled standard. For an analysis of the major factors influencing commit-
ment decisions under the grave disability standard in California, see C. WARREN, supra note 16, at
165-67.
134. The Harris court did not discuss what standard of evidence the state must meet to acquire a
summons, but logically it would be no greater than a preponderance of the evidence, since that is the
standard the state must meet at the first commitment hearing. WASH REV CODE § 71.05.240 (1983).
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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failed to fully analyze these issues, it only partially succeeded in con-
forming the law of involuntary commitment to the Constitution.
Betty L. Drumheller
Author's Note:
The statute referred to throughout the text is the statute in effect at the
time of the Harris decision. On March 5, 1984, the last day of the 1984
legislative session, the Washington state House and Senate adopted a new
statute which incorporated the Harris court's procedural holdings, see su-
pra note 103, and added a new provision. Substitute S. 3181, 48th Leg.
(1984) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). The new statute
allows an individual to remain at home prior to the time of evaluation and
allows an attorney to be present during the admissions evaluation. In ad-
dition, another person may be present at the evaluation if the examining
personnel decide that the presence of another person will not present a
safety risk, delay the proceedings, or otherwise interfere with the evalua-
tion. The statute does not indicate if the person to be evaluated or the
attorney can exclude the third person from the admissions evaluation if
either so desires.
Having an attorney and possibly another person present at the examina-
tion should provide a less threatening environment for the examination
and may ensure a more accurate evidentiary record for the fourteen-day
hearing. The new statute, however, does not indicate how active a role
this third person may take in the evaluation proceedings, nor does the
statute require that an attorney be present. Therefore, the degree to which
the new evaluation procedure will protect the individual will depend on
whether attorneys are, in fact, present at most examinations and how ac-
tive a role they play. Whether the opportunity to have an attorney present
during the examination will encourage pre-hearing release, discourage
nonconsensual, pre-hearing drug therapy, or promote the individual's
right to the least restrictive alternative, remains to be seen. The new stat-
ute is, however, a welcome improvement over the old summons proce-
dure.
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